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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMMERCE CLAUSE-STATE
TAXATION-APPORTIONMENT OF SALES TAXES-The United
States Supreme Court held that an unapportioned sales tax on
the sale of tickets for interstate bus transportation services is
not in violation of the "dormant" Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution.
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct.
1331 (1995).
Oklahoma imposes an excise tax on the gross receipts of in-
state sales of certain goods and services, including bus tickets
purchased for interstate transportation services.' The tax is a
component of the buyer's purchase price; the seller collects and
remits the tax to the state.2 Jefferson Lines, Inc. ("Jefferson")
provided passenger bus services in Oklahoma from 1988 to
1990.' Jefferson collected and remitted the tax on passengers'
tickets that the company sold in Oklahoma for routes beginning
and ending in Oklahoma.' Jefferson did not collect taxes on
tickets sold in Oklahoma for travel originating in Oklahoma but
destined to locations outside of the state.5
1. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1334 n.1
(1995). OKA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1354(1) (Supp. 1988) provides in pertinent part: "There
is hereby levied upon all sales .. . an excise tax of four percent of the gross re-
ceipts . . . of each sale of the following .. . (C) Transportation for hire to persons
by common carriers, including . . . motor transportation companies . . . and other
means of transportation for hire." OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1354(1) (Supp. 1988) (cur-
rent version at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 1354(1) (1995)).
2. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1334.
3. Id. at 1335.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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Jefferson filed for bankruptcy on October 27, 1989.' The
Oklahoma Tax Commission (the "Commission") filed a proof of
claims' in the United States Bankruptcy Court for Jefferson's
failure to collect the tax.8 Jefferson objected to the claims by
arguing that Oklahoma's tax violated the Commerce Clause'
because it subjected the company or its passengers to
cumulative taxation by other states of passage on interstate
routes." Jefferson also asserted that the taxing statute allowed
Oklahoma to collect a tax measured by the full price of the
ticket sold even though a portion of the benefit from purchasing
the ticket was derived outside of the state."
The United States Bankruptcy Court decided in favor of
Jefferson. 2 The United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed. 3 The court of appeals ruled for Jefferson based upon
a previous United States Supreme Court decision which held
that a state's unapportioned gross receipts tax imposed on
tickets sold for interstate bus travel was in contra to the
Commerce Clause." The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
address the issue of whether Oklahoma's imposition of a sales
tax on the full purchase price of bus tickets for transportation
services originating in Oklahoma and destined for other states
6. Id.
7. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1335. A proof of claims is defined as a
"[s]tatement under oath filed in a bankruptcy proceeding by a creditor in which the
creditor sets forth the amount owed and sufficient detail to identify the basis for the
claim." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1215 (6th ed. 1990).
8. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1335. Jefferson's failure to collect and remit
the tax on its in-state sales to passengers on routes destined outside of Oklahoma
was discovered during an audit by the Commission of Jefferson's sales tax returns.
Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. 1331 (No. 93-1677). The Com-
mission assessed a deficiency against Jefferson of $46,659. Id.
9. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1335. The Commerce Clause provides: "The
Congress shall have [plower . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1335.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 15 F.3d
90 (8th Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.,
115 S. Ct. 1331 (1995).
14. Jefferson Lines, 15 F.3d at 92-93 (citing Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v.
Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948)). See infra notes 102-09 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Central Greyhound. "Gross receipts" taxes are imposed on the gross
receipts from sales and are payable by the seller. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1335
n.3 (citing P. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATION ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION § 8:1
(1981)).
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was permissible under the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution. 5
The Supreme Court began its analysis with a review of the
progression of jurisprudence in state taxation of interstate
commerce 16 under the "dormant" Commerce Clause. 7 Justice
Souter, writing for the Court, 8 explained that the term
"dormant" Commerce Clause referred to the Court's judicial
interpretation of the Commerce Clause that prohibits state
taxation of interstate commerce in certain instances, even when
Congress has remained silent on the issue. The Court stated
that after a period of doctrinal wavering, the modern view is
that interstate commerce may be made to pay its just share of a
state tax burden.0 The Court identified a four-part test which
permits state taxation of interstate commerce under the
Commerce Clause when there is: (1) a "substantial nexus"
between the activity taxed and the taxing state; (2) the tax is
"fairly apportioned" to the activities in the taxing state; (3) the
tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce to the
benefit of intrastate commerce; and (4) the tax is fairly related
to the benefits conferred upon the taxpayer by the taxing
state." The Court then assessed the constitutionality of
Oklahoma's sales tax under the four-part test.
22
The Court determined that ticket sales were taxable by the
15. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1334. "Sales taxes" are imposed on the gross
receipts from sales and are payable by the buyer. Id. at 1335 n.3 (citing HARTMAN,
supra note 14, § 10.1). The seller collects the sales tax imposed on the buyer and
remits the taxes to the taxing body. Id.
16. Id. at 1335. Interstate commerce is defined as: "Traffic, intercourse, com-
mercial trading, or transportation of persons or property between or among the sev-
eral states of the Union, or from or between points in one state and points in an-
other." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 819 (6th ed. 1990). Conversely, intrastate commerce
is defined as commerce within a state. Id. at 823.
17. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1335-37.
18. Id. at 1334. Justice Souter was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices Stevens, Kennedy and Ginsburg. Id.
19. Id. at 1335.
20. Id. at 1337 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274
(1977)). The Court in Complete Auto sustained a franchise tax imposed on the privi-
lege of engaging in interstate commerce. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 288-89. A fran-
chise tax is defined as a tax on the right and privilege of conducting business as a
corporate entity. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 659 (6th ed. 1990).
21. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1337 (citing Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279).
A nexus requires that there be some minimum connection between the taxing state
and the person or thing that a state seeks to tax. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S.
207, 210-11 (1960). The Supreme Court requires that a taxpayer maintain a physical
presence within the taxing state to satisfy the Commerce Clause demands of sub-
stantial nexus before a state may impose an obligation to collect sales and use tax-
es. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
22. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1337-46.
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state because the act of purchasing a ticket in Oklahoma,
coupled with the origination of services in Oklahoma, resulted in
a sufficient nexus between the transaction and the State of
Oklahoma.3
Having determined that the tax satisfied the nexus
requirement, the Court then addressed the question of whether
the tax at issue was fairly apportioned to ensure that Oklahoma
taxed only its fair share of interstate commerce.24 The Court
indicated that fair apportionment in the taxation of interstate
commerce required that a tax be both internally and externally
consistent in order to ensure that interstate commerce is not
placed at a disadvantage vis-a-vis intrastate commerce.2
Justice Souter opined that Oklahoma's taxing scheme was
internally consistent because only one state could impose a tax
triggered by an in-state ticket sale for travel originating in the
state of the sale. 2' The Court explained that no sale would be
subject to multiple taxation because only one state may claim
this combination of events on any particular ticket sale."
The majority determined that Oklahoma's unapportioned tax
on the sale of goods was externally consistent because the laws
and amenities in the state of sale, Oklahoma, contributed to the
culmination of the sale between the transacting parties." The
Court analogized the economic activities of a ticket sale and
commencement of transportation services in Oklahoma with the
delivery of goods within the taxing state upon their purchase for
consumption.29 The Court stated that there has never been a
requirement that goods be consumed within the taxing state as
23. Id. at 1338 (citing D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 33 (1988)).
24. Id.
25. Id. The internal and external consistency tests were developed in the ma-
jority opinion of Justice Brennan in Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S.
159, 169 (1983). Internal consistency in an apportionment formula mandates that a
state is prohibited from imposing a tax on interstate commerce, which if the identi-
cal taxing statute was hypothetically duplicated by every state would result in a risk
of multiple taxation to which intrastate commerce would not be exposed. 1 JEROME
R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION T 4.08[1][a] (2d ed. 1993).
External consistency requires that the revenue taxed by a state is proportionate to
the business transacted in that state. Id. 4.08[1][b].
26. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1338.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1339. A sale of goods is considered a "discrete event facilitated by
the laws and amenities of the place of sale." Id. Consistent with this view, the
Court has held that sales taxes are properly levied upon the gross charge for the
purchase, regardless of commerce outside of the taxing jurisdiction that was anteced-
ent or subsequent to the sale. Id. (citing McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining
Co., 309 U.S. 33, 60 (1940)).
29. Id. at 1339 (citing Berwind-White, 309 U.S. at 58).
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a condition for taxing the entire sale.3" Jefferson's contention
that purchase or delivery of interstate transportation services
was distinguishable from the delivery of goods for consumption
within the taxing state was rejected by the Court.3
Additionally, recent precedent supported the Court's view that a
sale of interstate services could be taxed as a local event at the
full purchase price.2 Because Oklahoma's tax raised no greater
risk of multiple taxation than unapportioned sales taxes that
were previously determined constitutional, the Court concluded
that a sales tax measured by the full value of a sale of interstate
services was externally consistent.3
Justice Souter distinguished the precedent relied on by the
lower courts in finding that the tax was unconstitutional based
upon differences in the risk of multiple taxation and the identity
of the taxpayer." The distinction was founded on the basis that
passengers could not be subject to multiple taxation because no
other state could be the site of the agreement, the payment and
delivery of some services, which comprised the taxable event for
the majority." The Court stated that Oklahoma's sales tax did
not place interstate commerce at a disadvantage due to
successive use3" or gross receipts taxes potentially imposed by
other states of passage.37 Moreover, the Court reasoned that
any subsequent state tax would have to comply with Commerce
Clause requirements that demand equality in the treatment of
30. Id. at 1341.
31. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1341.
32. Id. at 1338 (citing Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 263 (1989)). Illinois'
telecommunications tax on the entire charge resulting from a customer's interstate
telephone call sustained a Commerce Clause challenge where the call originated or
terminated within the state and was billed or charged to an Illinois address.
Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 262.
33. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1344. Justice Souter stated: "There is thus
no reason to leave the line of longstanding precedent and lose the simplicity of our
general rule sustaining sales taxes measured by full value, simply to carve out an
exception for the subcategory of sales of interstate transportation services." Id.
34. Id. at 1341 (citing Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653
(1948)). The Court in Central Greyhound held that New York's gross receipts tax
violated the Commerce Clause because the seller's taxable gross receipts from inter-
state transportation services were unapportioned and exposed to taxes imposed by
other states. Central Greyhound, 334 U.S. at 662-63.
35. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1341.
36. Id. at 1343. A use tax is defined as a sales tax that is collectible by the
seller where a purchaser is domiciled in another state. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1543 (6th ed. 1990). A use tax complements a sales tax by requiring the seller to
collect a tax on property purchased in-state for use or consumption outside the state.
Id. A use tax prevents tax avoidance on articles purchased in a taxing jurisdiction
that does not levy a sales tax or that taxes at a rate lower than that imposed by
the state in which the property is used or consumed. Id.
37. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1342-43.
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interstate and intrastate taxpayers."
Additionally, Jefferson argued that the gross receipts should
be apportioned on the basis of mileage because mileage would be
feasible to apportion. 9 While the Court acknowledged the
feasibility of apportioning the taxable receipts based upon
mileage, it declined to require apportionment because Jefferson
failed to show that Oklahoma's tax was disproportionate to the
business transacted in the state.4
The Court next addressed the third prong of the test which
requires that a state tax must not discriminate against
interstate commerce.4 Jefferson argued that Oklahoma's tax
discriminated against interstate commerce by taxing a ticket
purchase at the same four percent rate regardless of whether
the ticket related to a wholly in-state route or to travel in which
only a small portion of the trip was within Oklahoma."2 The
Court distinguished its holding in American Trucking Ass'n v.
Scheiner" from the facts of Jefferson Lines because the tax in
American Trucking Ass'n had been imposed upon the privilege of
using state roads while engaged in interstate commerce; while in
the case at bar the tax was imposed upon the buyer's freedom to
enter into a sale that was facilitated by the state." Because
38. Id. Jefferson did not provide any evidence of successive taxes imposed on
its interstate bus travel. Id. The risk of multiple sales or use taxation of property
purchased or consumed in one state and brought into another state for consumption
is largely eliminated by credits against the use tax for sales or use taxes paid to
other states, or exemptions from the use tax for articles taxed in other states.
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 25, $ 18.08[2]. Nearly every state that imposes a sales and
use tax permits a credit or exemption against that state's tax for similar taxes paid
to other states. Id. 18.08[1]. This results in a national taxing scheme under which
the first state of use or purchase taxes the transactions. Id.
39. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1343. Cf. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252,
264-65 (1989) (rejecting the feasibility of apportioning gross receipts from interstate
telephone calls based upon mileage due to insurmountable technological barriers in
tracing the path of a telephone call created by the complexity of modern
telecommunications). The Court in Central Greyhound stated that the revenues from
interstate commerce could be fairly apportioned to each state based upon the ratio of
miles traveled within the state in interstate commerce activities compared to the
total mileage traveled in interstate commerce. Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v.
Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 662-63.
40. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1343-44.
41. Id. at 1344.
42. Id. at 1345. Jefferson relied on the Court's decision in American Trucking
Ass'n v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987). Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1345. In Amer.
ican Trucking Ass'n, the Court ruled that a flat tax on trucks for the privilege of
using Pennsylvania's roads violated the Commerce Clause. American Trucking Ass'n,
483 U.S. at 290. The tax was unconstitutional because of the disproportionate tax
burden imposed on out-of-state trucks compared to the tax per mile borne by local
trucks. Id. The disproportionate burden occurred because the out-of-state trucks trav-
eled less miles per year on Pennsylvania's highways than local trucks. Id.
43. 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
44. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1345. See supra note 42 for a discussion of
Vol. 34:139
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Oklahoma facilitated sales of bus services equally for interstate
and intrastate travelers, the state's sales tax was not considered
discriminatory by the Court. 5 Miles traveled within the state
were not seen by the majority as relevant to the value conferred
by the state in simplifying a sales transaction."
The fourth prong of the test demands a fair relation between
the tax imposed and the benefits conferred upon the taxpayer by
the state.47 Jefferson argued that Oklahoma's tax did not fairly
relate to the benefits conferred by the state because such
benefits were realized only during the in-state portion of a
trip.' The Court responded by stating that the Commerce
Clause demands only a fair relation between the benefits
conferred by a state and the tax imposed by it.' The Court
explained that this criterion required only that there be a
reasonable relationship between the measure of a tax and the
taxpayer's presence or activities within the taxing state.0
Further, the Court stated that interstate commerce may be
made to contribute to governmental services provided by the
state, such as police and fire protection, even if the taxpayer
received no direct benefit from these services.5' The Court
concluded that a tax levied on a sale in a state and measured by
the gross proceeds of services purchased was reasonably related
to the activities in the state and was fairly related to the
benefits conferred on the taxpayer by the state.2
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held
that Oklahoma's sales tax on the unapportioned gross receipts
from ticket purchases in Oklahoma for interstate transportation
services was a tax on a sale wholly within Oklahoma and was
not in violation of the "dormant" Commerce Clause.53
Justice Scalia authored a concurring opinion which called for
an end to the use of the "eminently unhelpful" four-part test in
"dormant" Commerce Clause jurisprudence.5  For Justice
American Trucking Ass'n.
45. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1345.
46. Id. The Court reasoned that the subsequent movement of goods outside of
the taxing state had no relationship to the benefits conferred upon the transacting
parties by the state imposing a sales tax. Id. (citing Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida
Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986)).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1345-46.
50. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1346 (citing Commonwealth Edison Co. v.




54. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Thomas joined in the concurrence. Id.
1995
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Scalia, the Oklahoma tax was in conformity with the Commerce
Clause because it did not facially discriminate against interstate
commerce." He believed that Congress, acting under its
Commerce Clause powers, should assess whether interstate
commerce requires protection from certain nondiscriminatory
state action." According to Justice Scalia, the Court should not
engage in such an assessment.57
Justice Breyer, writing for the dissent,"' asserted that the
Oklahoma tax at issue was analogous to an unapportioned tax
imposed upon interstate transportation services which the Court
had previously held unconstitutional. 9 Justice Breyer believed
that the taxing scheme was an attempt to tax more than
Oklahoma's fair share of the in-state component of the subject
activity.0 He further stated that the distinguishable result
arising from the majority's characterization of a New York tax
as a "gross receipts" tax and Oklahoma's tax as a "sales tax"
ignored the practical economic similarities of both taxes.61 The
dissent asserted that the tax was imposed upon the
transportation of passengers and not on the sale of a ticket.2
Based upon this analysis, the dissent concluded that the tax was
imposed upon interstate commerce itself and must be
apportioned based upon the revenue which reasonably reflected
Oklahoma's component of the interstate activity."
The concurring Justices stated that the Complete Auto four-part test should be aban-
doned by the Court. Id. See supra note 21 and accompanying text for the elements
of the test.
55. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1346. The concurring Justices believed that
the issue of whether a state tax complies with the demands of the "negative" Com-
merce Clause should be limited to the Court's determination of whether the tax
facially discriminates against interstate commerce. Id. While the Commerce Clause is
an affirmative grant of power to Congress for the regulation of interstate commerce,
the Court has stated that the Clause contains a negative sweep that acts as a
boundary or limitation on a state's power to tax interstate commerce. Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992).
56. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1346.
57. Id.
58. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor joined in the dissent. Id.
59. Id. (citing Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948)).
60. Id. at 1349 (citing Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 262 (1989)). Justice
Breyer noted that while the majority relied in part upon Goldberg in its opinion, the
Goldberg Court distinguished the result in that case from those cases requiring ap-
portionment involving "the movement of large physical objects over identifiable
routes, where it was practicable to keep track of the distance actually traveled with-
in the taxing state." Id. Resting on this distinction, Justice Breyer concluded that
the Court's holding in Goldberg, permitting an unapportioned sales tax on interstate
telephone service, did not modify the result in Central Greyhound. Id.
61. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1348.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1349 (citing Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 262).
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In Case of the State Freight Tax (Reading R.R. v.
Pennsylvania)," the Supreme Court held that the Commerce
Clause placed negative implications on a state's power to tax
interstate commerce. 5 The issue facing the Court was whether
Pennsylvania's tax on freight transported through the state in
interstate commerce was in violation of the Commerce Clause.66
The Court rejected the argument that the tax was compensatory
for the use of the state's railroads, and the Court determined
that a tax on freight tonnage transported among and between
the states was a regulation of interstate commerce. Justice
Strong, writing for the majority, stated that Congress had the
exclusive power to regulate those subjects demanding a national
or uniform system of regulation. 8 Justice Strong considered the
free passage of freight or merchandise between states to be of
such vital importance as to demand singular regulation by
Congress." The majority expressed concern that if one state
could directly tax the movement of goods or persons through the
state, then each succeeding state of passage may also impose its
own tax.7" This potential for cumulative taxation and
destruction of national commerce was of such importance that
the Court deemed that it required exclusive legislation by
Congress. 1 The Court held that a state cannot tax freight
transported in interstate commerce because such power is
exclusively vested in Congress."
In Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue,73 a New Mexico
statute imposed a franchise tax that was measured by a
publisher's gross advertising receipts, including receipts from
out-of-state customers.74 The petitioner's, Western Live Stock,
in-state business activities included preparing, editing and
publishing a monthly trade journal.75 The company's only office
64. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872).
65. Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 271-72.
66. Id. at 276. Pennsylvania imposed a specified rate of tax per ton of freight
transported within the state. Id. at 273. A regulation of interstate commerce oc-
curred because the tax applied to commodities shipped from outside of the state to
points within the state, and the tax was assessed on freight shipped from inside of
the state that was destined to points outside of Pennsylvania. Id. at 273-75.
67. Id. at 277-79.
68. Id. at 279-80 (citing Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299
(1851)).
69. Id. at 280.
70. Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 279.
71. Id. at 279-80.
72. Id. at 282.
73. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
74. Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 251-52.
75. Id. at 252.
1995
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was located within New Mexico.7" The company solicited
advertising outside of the state and the circulation of its journal
extended beyond New Mexico's borders.77
The Court addressed the issue of whether New Mexico's
imposition of a franchise tax was in violation of the Commerce
Clause because the tax was imposed on gross receipts from the
sale of advertising space to advertisers in other states, and
because the journal was circulated to subscribers within and
without of New Mexico." Justice Stone, writing for the
majority, declared that interstate commerce must pay its fair
share of state taxes imposed on business.79 The Court noted
that taxes previously held as unconstitutional had violated the
Commerce Clause by placing interstate commerce at a risk of
multiple taxation that local commerce did not face." Gross
receipts taxes on interstate commerce were identified as
particularly susceptible to being in violation of the Commerce
Clause.81 However, the Court stated that fairly apportioned
taxes on gross receipts were sustainable under the Commerce
Clause.82
The Court concluded that the franchise tax was imposed on
in-state rather than interstate business activities. 3 The Court
stressed that the preparation, printing and publishing of the
advertisements occurred in-state, resulting in a tax on local
commerce." Any value on advertising rates attributable to
interstate distribution of the journal was considered to be too
remote by the Court in determining whether the tax excessively
burdened interstate commerce." Furthermore, the Court found
that there was no risk of multiple taxation because the tax was
76. Id.
77. Id. at 252-53.
78. Id. at 254.
79. Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 254. For Justice Stone, the function of the
Commerce Clause was not to immunize interstate commerce from state taxation
rather, the Commerce Clause permitted a fairly apportioned state tax on interstate
commerce. Id. at 254-55.
80. id. at 255-56. The Court cited the following cases which held that state
taxes on interstate commerce were unconstitutional because of an impermissible risk
of multiple state taxation: Fargo v. Stevens, 121 U.S. 230 (1887), Philadelphia & S.
Mail S.S. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887), Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Texas,
210 U.S. 217 (1908), Meyer v. Wells Fargo & Co., 223 U.S. 298 (1912), Crew Live-
stock Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 650 (1936) and Case of the State Freight Tax,
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872). Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 255-56.
81. Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 255.
82. Id. at 256.
83. Id. at 258.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 259.
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imposed on advertising rates, and the activities relating to
advertising were purely local to New Mexico."6 The Court held
that New Mexico's franchise tax statute did not pose a threat of
multiple taxation on interstate commerce and therefore was not
in violation of the Commerce Clause. 7
In McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co.,' the
Court was confronted with the issue of whether a New York City
sales tax statute was in violation of the Commerce Clause. 9
The tax was levied against a buyer on the gross sales price of
tangible goods moved in interstate commerce, but transferred to
the buyer for consumption within New York City limits."0 The
respondent, Berwind-White, a Pennsylvania coal mining
company, maintained a New York City sales office and entered
into contracts with customers in New York City. 1 Coal was
mined in Pennsylvania and delivered interstate via rail and
barge to Berwind-White's New York City customers. 2 Berwind-
White transferred possession of the coal to its customers within
the city limits.9
The Court acknowledged that concurrent taxing power existed
between Congress and the several states.9 4 The Court stated
that judicial interpretation of state taxing power under the
Commerce Clause had prohibited taxing statutes that placed
interstate commerce at a disadvantage with intrastate
commerce.9" However, the Court noted that the Commerce
86. Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 260.
87. Id. at 260-61.
88. 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
89. Berwind-White, 309 U.S. at 41.
90. Id. The tax was predicated on the transfer of title or possession of the
tangible goods within the state, or where the parties consummated an agreement
within the state for the transfer of the goods. Id. at 43-44.
91. Id. at 44.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Berwind-White, 309 U.S. at 45. The Court discussed that the Commerce
Clause did not preempt state taxation on interstate commerce. Id. However, Su-
preme Court decisions recognized that the power conferred upon Congress to regu-
late interstate commerce limited a state's ability to regulate interstate commerce. Id.
95. Id. The Court cited numerous cases where state taxes had a discriminato-
ry effect in interstate commerce including the following: Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910) (holding that a license tax imposed on a multistate
corporation's entire capital stock value violated the Commerce Clause), Leloup v.
Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888) (holding that a privilege tax measured by a percentage
of gross receipts, including activities in interstate commerce was in violation of the
Commerce Clause), McCall v. California, 136 U.S. 104 (1890) (holding that a fixed
sum license fee imposed on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce activi-
ties violated the Commerce Clause) and the Case of State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 232 (1872) (holding that state taxation of articles in the stream of interstate
commerce violated the Commerce Clause). Berwind-White, 309 U.S. at 46-48.
1995
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Clause was not intended to protect interstate commerce from its
fair share of state tax burden arising from interstate business
operations." The Court opined that the present tax did not
discriminate against interstate commerce because the tax was
levied on every transfer in the state in which goods were
purchased for consumption.97 Since the tax was imposed
equally on interstate and intrastate commerce, the Court
determined that New York's taxing power did not infringe upon
the Commerce Clause.98
The Court refuted Berwind-White's argument that the tax at
issue was unconstitutional because it was imposed upon gross
proceeds and was related to commerce within and without New
York.99 The Court reasoned that this was an attempt to tax a
local activity consisting of the delivery of purchased goods in the
state of consumption, rather than a tax on commerce beyond
New York."°° The taxing statute was upheld by the Court as a
local activity within the state's taxing power.'
In Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey,'0' New York
taxed the entire gross receipts from the petitioner's, Central
Greyhound, sale of bus services provided to passengers in
interstate commerce.' 3 Central Greyhound argued that the
Commerce Clause prohibited a state tax on the entire gross
receipts from the transportation of passengers in interstate
commerce."° The Court indicated that the record was devoid of
any evidence indicating actual multiple taxation on the gross
receipts from interstate commerce." 5 Nonetheless, the Court
held that an unapportioned gross receipts tax discriminates
against interstate commerce, regardless of whether multiple
taxation of receipts from interstate commerce actually
96. Berwind-White, 309 U.S. at 46 (citing Western Live Stock v. Bureau of
Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)).
97. Id. at 48-49.
98. Id. at 49-50.
99. Id. at 57.
100. Id. at 58.
101. Berwind-White, 309 U.S. at 58.
102. 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
103. Central Greyhound, 334 U.S. at 660. The tax at issue was levied on gross
receipts from bus routes that began and were destined to locations in New York. Id.
at 664 (Murphy, J., dissenting). The routes required travel through Pennsylvania and
New Jersey before reaching a New York destination. Id. at 665. The majority noted
that such travel was interstate commerce because the routes commenced in a state
and included travel through another state. Id. at 660. New York did not tax receipts
from routes originating in New York and destined outside of the state. Id. at 665
(Murphy J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 654.
105. Id. at 662.
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occurred." However, the Court found that the New York tax
statute could be upheld if it was fairly apportioned based upon
the mileage traveled within New York as compared to the total
mileage of all interstate routes.' °7 The majority stated that
such an apportionment would result in the assessment of a tax
fairly apportioned based upon intrastate commerce.' The
Court also stated that an apportionment based upon mileage
was not burdensome. 1e
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,"' the Court was
faced with the issue of whether state taxation on the privilege of
engaging in interstate commerce was in violation of the
Commerce Clause."' Justice Blackmun, writing for a
unanimous Court, considered the wisdom of two divergent
philosophies concerning state taxation of interstate commerce -
the "free trade" approach and the "multiple taxation"
doctrine."' The free trade approach considered the Commerce
Clause to be a safe haven that forbade state taxation on
interstate commerce because taxing was an impediment to the
free flow of trade between the states."' The multiple taxation
doctrine, espoused by Justice Stone in Western Live Stock,
recognized that the Commerce Clause did not relieve interstate
commerce from its fair share of the state tax burden.""
The petitioner, Complete Auto, transported new automobiles
within Mississippi to Mississippi automobile dealers."' The
106. Id. at 663 (citing Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946)).
107. Id. The statute at issue permitted apportionment consistent with the
Court's opinion. Id. at 663-64.
108. Central Greyhound, 334 U.S. at 663 (citing Western Live Stock v. Bureau
of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 255 (1938)).
109. Id.
110. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
111. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 274.
112. Id. at 278-79.
113. Id. at 278 n.7 (citing Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946)). The free
trade approach was a reversion by the Court to an earlier tax doctrine that declared
a direct tax on interstate commerce unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. Id.
The Court subsequently narrowed its interpretation to prohibiting state taxes on the
privilege of conducting interstate commerce. See Specter Motor Service v. O'Connor,
340 U.S. 602 (1951), overruled by Complete Auto Transit, Inc v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274, 288-89). The majority in Freeman categorized the tax in Berwind-White as a
consumption tax which was distinguished from a direct tax on interstate commerce
that was unconstitutional under the free trade approach. Freeman, 329 U.S. at 257.
114. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279 (citing Western Live Stock v. Bureau of
Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938)). The multiple taxation doctrine was embraced as a
practical rather than a formal analysis of the constitutionality of state taxation un-
der the Commerce Clause. Id.
115. Id. at 276. The automobiles were shipped by General Motors from
Michigan to Mississippi, where Complete Auto received the automobiles and deliv-
ered them in-state to dealers. Id.
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Court decided that Complete Auto's transportation activities
were part of interstate commerce that involved the
transportation of the automobiles from outside of Mississippi to
Mississippi dealers.' Mississippi taxed the privilege of doing
business within the state by levying a five percent tax on the
gross income resulting from transportation of property beginning
and ending in the state."7  Complete Auto argued that
Mississippi's tax violated the Commerce Clause based upon the
Court's precedent that prohibited state taxation on the privilege
of engaging in interstate commerce."'
In rejecting the view prohibiting state tax on the privilege of
conducting interstate commerce, the Court overruled Spector
Motor Service v. O'Connor."9 The Court criticized the Spector
decision as a labeling or formal approach that ignored the
economic reality of the tax imposed by the state."0 The Court
noted that Spector and subsequent decisions of the Court had
produced conflicting constitutional results for economically
similar state taxes.'2 ' The Court stated that the differing
results were attributable to the title given to the tax by the state
legislature.'22
Three times in the course of the opinion, Justice Blackmun
stated that a tax statute may be sustained against a Commerce
Clause challenge where the activity taxed has a "sufficient
nexus" to the taxing state; is "fairly apportioned" to the business
activity in the state; is fairly related to the benefits provided by
the taxing state to the taxpayer; and does not discriminate
against interstate commerce to the advantage of intrastate
commerce.'23 The Court considered this to be a practical rather
than a formal analysis in resolving the constitutionality of a
state's tax on interstate commerce. 24  Mississippi's taxing
statute was upheld as being non-violative of the Commerce
116. Id. at 276 n.4.
117. Id. at 275.
118. Id. at 277-78 (citing Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1991),
overruled by Complete Auto Transit, Inc v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288-89 and Free-
man v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946)).
119. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 288-89.
120. Id. at 278-80.
121. Id. at 284.
122. Id. at 284-85. Compare Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359
(1954) ("Railway Express I") (declaring a statute imposing a tax on gross receipts for
the "privilege" of doing business in a state unconstitutional) with Railway Express
Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959) ("Railway Express II") (upholding a statute
imposing a "franchise tax on intangible property" measured by gross receipts).
123. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 278-79, 287.
124. Id. at 279.
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Clause because the taxpayer's only challenge to its
constitutionality rested on formal rather than substantive
violations of the Commerce Clause. 2 5
In Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Revenue,'2 6  the Court considered whether the Foreign
Commerce Clause 2 7 prohibited Florida from taxing the sales
price of fuel purchased in Florida by a Canadian airline and
consumed in exclusively foreign commerce.1
2
1
The petitioner, Wardair Canada, Inc. ("Wardair"), operated
flight routes to and from the United States.'2 9 A Florida
statute imposed a sales tax of five percent on a stipulated price
per gallon of fuel purchased in-state. 30 The tax was assessed
on the entire sales price even though the fuel was consumed in
commerce outside of the state.'' Wardair objected that the
taxing statute was in violation of the Commerce Clause because
it was assessed upon foreign airlines engaged in exclusively
foreign commerce. 2' The Court characterized Wardair's
challenge as an attempt to persuade the Court that Congress
preempted state regulation of international aviation by enacting
the Federal Aviation Act.
133
125. Id. at 289. The taxpayer's argument rested solely with the Court's deci-
sions that declared privilege taxes unconstitutional if the in-state activities were part
of interstate commerce conducted by the taxpayer. Id. There was no assertion that
Mississippi's tax violated any prong of the four part test sustaining the constitution-
ality of a tax on interstate commerce activities emanating from the Court's opinion.
Id. at 287.
126. 477 U.S. 1 (1986).
127. Wardair, 477 U.S. at 3. The Foreign Commerce Clause is the power dele-
gated to Congress under the Commerce Clause to regulate all commercial intercourse
between the United States and foreign countries. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 269
(6th ed. 1990).
128. Wardair, 477 U.S. at 3.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 3-4. The tax statute imposed a tax on the consumer of motor and
special fuels at five percent of the established sales price of $1.148 per gallon. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 212.62 (West 1985) (amended 1990).
131. Wardair, 477 U.S. at 4.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 5-6. The Court stated that under the Supremacy Clause, the federal
government may displace state law through the exercise of congressional power
granted under the Constitution. Id. at 6. The Court provided that preemption may
occur if: (1) Congress expressly states its intention that federal legislation preempts
state law; or (2) in congressional silence on preemption, and in absence of an actual
conflict between federal and state law, the evidence indicates congressional intent to
preempt a specific field regulated by state law. Id. at 6. Congressional legislation re-
sulted in extensive regulation by the federal government over aviation travel. See
Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), repealed by Act of
Pub. L. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379 (1994). The Federal Aviation Act delegated
the regulation of licensing, route service, fare rates, tariffs and other aspects of for-
eign air travel to agencies of the United States Government. Wardair, 477 U.S. at 6.
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The Court's "dormant" Commerce Clause analysis concerned
the determination of whether Florida's tax threatened the values
protected by the Commerce Clause." 4 In matters of foreign
commerce, the majority noted that states must not act to the
detriment of the nation as a whole.'35 The Court reasoned that
in assessing whether a state tax interferes with the federal
government's authority to regulate foreign commerce, the tax
must first satisfy the four-pronged test of Complete Auto.3'
Additionally, in resolving issues concerning the Foreign
Commerce Clause, the Court's inquiry included a determination
of whether the tax at issue created a substantial risk of multiple
international taxation, as well as whether the tax interfered
with the federal government's ability to speak with one voice in
regulating foreign commerce.'37
The Court indicated that Wardair conceded that Florida's tax
satisfied the Complete Auto test.3 ' Additionally, the Court
stated that Wardair did not dispute the absence of any threat of
multiple international taxation because the tax was imposed on
a discrete transaction, the sale of fuel, which occurred only in
the United States.'39 The Court then considered whether
Florida's sales tax interfered with the federal government's
ability to "speak with one voice" in regulating commercial
relations with foreign governments." The Court stated that
its review of seventy bilateral aviation agreements failed to
reveal any instances in which local taxes were, prohibited on
aviation fuel used by foreign airlines in foreign commerce."'
The Court observed that a U.S.-Canadian Agreement prohibited
"national duties and charges" on foreign carriers, and the Court
considered the omission of any limitation on taxes by the
political subdivisions of the two countries as a policy choice
inherent in the agreement that permitted local taxation of
aviation fuel.' The Court perceived that by negative
implication, the United States Government had permitted state
134. Wardair, 477 U.S. at 7.
135. Id. at 7-8.
136. Id. at 8. See supra note 21 and accompanying text for the elements of the
test.
137. Wardair, 477 U.S. at 8.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 9.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 11.
142. Wardair, 477 U.S. at 11. The U.S.-Canadian Agreement is a bilateral
agreement between the United States and Canadian Governments that regulated
charter flights between the two countries. Nonscheduled Air Services Agreement,
May 8, 1974, U.S.-Can., art. XII, 25 U.S.T. 787.
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taxation of aviation fuel consumed by foreign carriers in
international commerce." The Court affirmed the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Florida and held for the Department of
Revenue.'"
In D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara,' the Court faced the
issue of whether Louisiana's use tax, assessed against goods
purchased outside of Louisiana for use in the state, satisfied
Commerce Clause scrutiny under the Complete Auto test.'4
The petitioner, D.H. Holmes Co. ("Holmes"), a Louisiana
corporation that operated several department stores in the state,
arranged for catalog mailings to its in-state customers by
contracting with out-of-state vendors.'4 v Holmes did not pay
sales tax to the states where the catalogs were designed or
shipped.'" Louisiana assessed a use tax under a statute that
imposed a tax on the gross retail cost of tangible property used
or consumed in the state, but not sold in Louisiana.' The
statute precluded multiple taxation of interstate commerce
through a credit mechanism that reduced any use tax owed to
Louisiana for sales taxes that were paid to other states upon the
sale or use of the same goods. 5°
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing the opinion for a unanimous
Court, evaluated the constitutionality of Louisiana's use tax
statute under the Complete Auto test. 5' The Court found that
there was a substantial nexus between Holmes and the state
143. Wardair, 477 U.S. at 12. The Federal Aviation Act expressly permitted
sales and use taxes on the sale of goods and services in regulating air commerce.
Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1513(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), repealed by 103
Pub. L. 272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 745 (1994). However, the Court concluded that this
affirmative grant of state power was not dispositive to the preemption issue because
of concerns that Congress did not consider whether such power would be exerted
over foreign rather than domestic air carriers. Wardair, 477 U.S. at 6-7.
144. Wardair, 477 U.S. at 13.
145. 486 U.S. 24 (1988).
146. D.H. Holmes, 486 U.S. at 26. See supra note 21 and accompanying text for
the elements of the test.
147. D.H. Holmes, 486 U.S. at 26.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 27. Louisiana's taxing statute imposed a three percent tax on all
tangible personal property used in Louisiana. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:302, 47:321
(West Supp. 1990). A use tax compensates the state of consumption for goods that
are purchased outside of the state but are used or consumed in the state. D.H.
Holmes 486 U.S. at 27-28.
150. D.H. Holmes, 486 U.S. at 31. The statute provided that: "A credit against
the use tax imposed by this Chapter shall be granted to taxpayers who have paid a
similar tax upon the sale or use of the same tangible personal property in another
State.' LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 303(A) (West 1990).
151. D.H. Holmes, 486 U.S. at 30. See supra note 21 and accompanying text for
the elements of the test.
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that allowed Louisiana to assess a use tax."2 Holmes provided
the mailing list of its customers for distribution; Holmes had
significant in-state operations; and the catalogs were aimed at
generating business from its Louisiana customers.'53 The Court
considered the use tax to be fairly apportioned because
Louisiana's taxing statute allowed for a credit against
Louisiana's use tax for any similar taxes paid to other states
relating to the same transaction." Additionally, the Court
noted that Louisiana did not tax Holmes on the value of the
catalogs that were shipped to its customers residing outside of
the state.'55 The Court held that the tax statute was not
discriminatory against interstate commerce because the state's
sales tax on goods purchased in-state was imposed at the same
rate as the state's use tax assessed on residents purchasing
goods outside of Louisiana for in-state consumption."5 Chief
Justice Rehnquist considered the tax fairly related to the
benefits enjoyed by Holmes from the governmental and civic
services provided by the state.'57  The Court held that
Louisiana's use tax satisfied each prong of the Complete Auto
test and the taxing statute was not in violation of the Commerce
Clause."'
In Goldberg v. Sweet," 9  the petitioners, two Illinois
residents, alleged that the Illinois Telecommunications Excise
Tax Act (the "Act") was in violation of the Commerce Clause.
60
The petitioners claimed that the Illinois taxing statute subjected
interstate commerce to multiple taxation because the tax was
imposed upon the gross purchase price of interstate
telecommunications services, rather than only the portion of the
charge relating to the passage of electronic impulses through the
State of Illinois."1  The Act taxed all telecommunications
services originating or terminating in Illinois and charged to an
152. D.H. Holmes, 486 U.S. at 32.
153. Id. at 32-33.
154. Id. at 31.
155. Id. at 32.
156. Id.
157. D.H. Holmes, 486 U.S. at 32. The Court considered the tax fairly related
to police and fire protection, mass transit, and maintenance services provided by the
state that facilitated Holmes' sale of goods within the state. Id.
158. Id. at 34.
159. 488 U.S. 252 (1989).
160. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 257. The Act stated: "A tax is imposed upon the act
or privilege of originating in this State or receiving in this State interstate telecom-
munications by a person in this State at the rate of 5% of the gross charge for such
telecommunications purchased at retail from a retailer by such person." ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 35, para. 630 § 4 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
161. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 260.
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Illinois service address, at five percent of the gross charge." 2
The tax applied equally to both interstate and intrastate
telecommunications activity.'63  Taxpayers received a credit
against the Illinois tax for any taxes paid to another state
resulting from the same interstate call."s The tax was imposed
on consumers and collected by telecommunication retailers. 5
The Court applied the Complete Auto test in assessing
whether Illinois' unapportioned tax on interstate
telecommunications services satisfied the demands of the
Commerce Clause.'66 The case revolved around the prong of
the Complete Auto test requiring that a state tax be fairly
apportioned.6 7 Justice Marshall, writing for the majority,
explained that the tax was internally consistent because only
one state could potentially tax an interstate call where a taxing
scheme required a charge to an in-state address before levying a
tax.1
68
In addressing the external consistency of the tax, the Court
recognized its precedent that permitted an unapportioned sales
tax on the gross charge of a retail purchase, regardless of
whether the retail purchase resulted from interstate
activities.6 9 The Court concluded that the Act did not pose an
unacceptable risk of multiple taxation of interstate commerce
because the operation of the credit provision for
telecommunications taxes paid in other states prevented
162. Id. at 256. The Court understood that an "Illinois service address" was an
in-state address where the telephone number and equipment were located, regardless
of where the call was billed or paid. Id. at 257. The Court provided an illustration:
A noncollect call, originating in Illinois, is charged to an Illinois service address
regardless of its destination or where the call is billed or paid; a noncollect call from
another state to an Illinois number would be outside of the Act's reach because it
would not be charged to an Illinois service address. Id. at 263 n.13. A collect call
made from another state to an Illinois number would be charged to an Illinois ser-
vice address. Id.
163. Id. at 264.
164. Id. at 256. The Act provides that:
To prevent actual multistate taxation of the act or privilege that is subject to
taxation under this paragraph, any taxpayer, upon proof that the taxpayer has
paid a tax in another State on such event, shall be allowed a credit against
the tax imposed in this Section 4 to the extent of the amount of such tax pro-
perly due and paid in such other State.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 35, para. 630 § 4 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
165. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 256-57.
166. Id. at 259-60. See supra note 21 and accompanying text for the elements
of the test.
167. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 260.
168. Id. at 261. See supra note 25 for an explanation of "internal consistency."
169. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 262 (citing McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Min-
ing Co., 309 U.S. 33, 58 (1940)).
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multiple taxation. 7 ' In dictum the Court suggested that only
two states had a "sufficient nexus" to tax a consumer's interstate
call.17' The Court reasoned that communication must have
originated or terminated within a state in order for there to be a
sufficient nexus between the transaction and the taxing
state.' The Court stated that a risk of multiple taxation
resulted from differences in state statutes under which a
particular telephone call may be taxable by: (1) the state in
which the call was billed or paid; and (2) the state where the
call was charged to a service address.173 However, the Act's
credit mechanism prevented actual cumulative taxation on the
telephone call.' 7" The majority considered the mere passage of
electronic signals through a state as an insufficient nexus
between the state and the activity to allow taxation of the
transaction. 7 '
The Court also viewed a tax on the unapportioned purchase
price as a pragmatic approach to state taxation. 7 ' This was
considered to be true because of the virtual impossibility of
tracing the precise transmission of impulses that resulted in a
completed telephone call.'77 The technological complexity of
telecommunications led the Court to conclude that geographical
apportionment of the tax lacked feasibility. 17  The Court
distinguished Central Greyhound's apportionment of receipts
based upon miles traveled over identifiable routes within the
taxing state on the basis that in Goldberg the inability to
determine the precise path of communication transmissions
made such an 'apportionment impractical. 7 ' The Court found
that the tax did not discriminate against interstate commerce
and the tax was fairly related to the activities within the
170. Id. at 264 (citing D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988)).
The relevant statutory language provided that in order to avoid cumulative state
taxation, a credit was given against the Illinois tax upon proof that the taxpayer
paid another state tax on the same telephone call. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 35, para. 630
§ 4 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
171. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 263.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 263-64. See supra note 164 for the relevant text of the Act.
175. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 263.
176. Id. at 265.
177. Id. at 264-65. The Court stated that it was virtually impossible to trace
the precise path of a completed telephone call because of the complexity involved in
a computerized network consisting of billions of potential paths in transmitting elec-
tronic signals from one point to another. Id. at 255.
178. Id. at 264-65.
179. Id. at 264 (citing Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653,
663 (1948)).
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state. '8 The Court affirmed the Illinois Supreme Court and
held that the Act was not in violation of the Commerce
Clause. "'
The Supreme Court has historically determined the
constitutionality of statutes imposing taxes measured by gross
proceeds by assessing whether the subject of the taxing statute
faces a risk of multiple taxation as a result of the failure to
apportion the gross receipts.' The Court has sustained an
unapportioned gross receipts tax levied upon a seller's privilege
of conducting commerce."8 ' Additionally, the Court has
sustained unapportioned sales taxes imposed on the purchaser
of goods for consumption and measured by gross receipts.'8
The analogy between these cases rests with the Court's position
that a tax measured by unapportioned gross receipts was fairly
related to the taxing state due to the wholly local nature of the
transaction." Any interstate commerce associated with the
transaction was considered by the Court as incidental to the
local activities and beyond the reach of all but the taxing
state." ' As the majority in Jefferson Lines recognized, the sale
of goods is viewed as a discrete event that is facilitated by the
laws and amenities of the state in which the sale occurs.'87
The Court in Central Greyhound required New York to
apportion the taxable value of the state's gross receipts tax
because of the risk of multiple taxation on the receipts from
interstate bus routes of the company."' An impermissible risk
of multiple taxation existed because New Jersey and
Pennsylvania had a sufficient nexus to Central Greyhound's
operations such that those states could extract their fair share of
taxes by imposing taxes on the same gross receipts that New
York sought to tax."9 Furthermore, regardless of potential
180. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 266-67.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Central Greyhound, 334 U.S. at 662; J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v.
Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938); Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 255.
183. See Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 259. See supra notes 73-87 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Western Live Stock.
184. See Wardair, 477 U.S. at 12; Berwind-White, 309 U.S. at 58. See supra
notes 126-144 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wardair. See supra notes
88-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of Berwind-White.
185. See Berwind-White, 309 U.S. at 58; Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 260.
186. See Berwind-White, 309 U.S. at 58; Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 260.
187. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1339. See also Wardair, 477 U.S. at 9 (ex-
plaining that the purchase of airplane fuel for use in foreign commerce is a discrete
transaction in one jurisdiction which precludes the risk of multiple taxation).
188. Central Greyhound, 334 U.S. at 662-63. See supra notes 102-09 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of Central Greyhound.
189. Central Greyhound, 334 U.S. at 662.
Duquesne Law Review
cumulative taxation, New York sought to tax a greater share of
commerce than it was entitled to tax.9 Analogizing the facts
of Central Greyhound to those of Jefferson Lines leads to the
conclusion that Oklahoma was attempting to unconstitutionally
tax more than the in-state component of the value of passenger
tickets by levying a tax measured by unapportioned gross
receipts. 9 ' While the Court in Jefferson Lines distinguished
the tax from Central Greyhound by characterizing it a sales tax,
the constitutionality of the tax cannot be established on the
basis of particular words or labels."9 2
The majority in Jefferson Lines reached the result that the
unapportioned tax was not in violation of the Commerce Clause
by virtually ignoring the economic reality of the subject
transaction.'93 The Court failed to consider that interstate
commerce significantly contributes to the value of the
transaction taxed by Oklahoma. In crafting a rule that
permitted an unapportioned sales tax on the purchase of
tangible goods, the Court was consistent with the parties'
objective of the sale-a delivery of the goods at a particular time
and place. In Jefferson Lines, the buyer contracted with the
seller to obtain transportation services from Oklahoma to
another state. 4 The buyer's objective in the transaction was
not to obtain dominion and control over the ticket's usage, but to
obtain transportation services from Oklahoma to another state.
This necessarily resulted in the tax being levied upon interstate
commerce itself. 9' For example, if a passenger purchases a
ticket for transit from Oklahoma to Minnesota, it is impossible
to regard the passage through each successive state as merely
incidental to the services rendered in Oklahoma. Such a
conclusion should be necessary to sustain the Court's holding
under a historical analysis of unapportioned taxes sustained by
the Court.
The connection between the interstate transportation services
provided and each state of passage along Jefferson Lines' bus
routes created a risk that one or more of the states would seek
to exact its fair share of taxes for the cost of providing
governmental services that benefit Jefferson Lines and the
company's passengers. The discussion of the Court's decisions
190. Id. at 663.
191. See id.
192. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 288.
193. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1348 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 1335.
195. Id. at 1349 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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protecting against "successive taxation" hints that the majority
recognized that Oklahoma's tax was an unapportioned tax on
interstate commerce.' The majority suggested that the first
state of purchase or use may rely upon the credit mechanism
commonly found in sales and use tax statutes to avoid
cumulative tax burdens.9 7 While under present statutory
schemes this may be true, there are risks of multiple taxation
resulting from gaps in the credit provisions and taxing schemes
that may arise in response to the Court's holding.98 For
instance, multiple taxation could arise on the subject transaction
in Jefferson Lines if another state's statute imposed a sales tax
on services performed within the state regardless of where the
agreement or payment for the services occurred. It is the risk of
discriminatory multiple taxation on interstate commerce that
the Court must protect against by invoking the powers laden in
the "dormant" Commerce Clause.'99 Additionally, Oklahoma's
statute is void of a credit mechanism similar to Illinois' statute
in Goldberg that avoided actual multiple taxation by allowing a
credit against that state's tax for any taxes paid to another state
resulting from the same transaction.0 0  Absent a credit
mechanism or apportionment of the measure of tax based upon
the in-state component of the value of transportation services
provided, the Court should have held that Oklahoma's tax did
not fairly relate to the economic activity within the state.'
196. Id. at 1341-44.
197. Id. at 1342-43.
198. The Court has never addressed the issue of whether a state must provide
a credit against its use tax for sales tax paid to another state. Williams v. Vermont,
472 U.S. 14, 28 (1985). The Court's decision in D.H. Holmes suggests that the Court
may eventually require a credit against a state's use tax for sales taxes paid in
other states. However, the Court has never expressly held that such a credit mecha-
nism is a constitutional requirement of fair apportionment. See D.H. Holmes, 486
U.S. at 31 (upholding Louisiana's use tax as fairly apportioned because the taxing
statute provided for a credit against the state's use tax for sales taxes paid to other
states).
199. "The immunities implicit in the Commerce Clause and the potential taxing
power of a State can hardly be made.to depend, in the world of practical affairs, on
the shifting incidence of the varying tax laws of the various States at a particular
moment." Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946).
200. See supra note 164 and the accompanying text for the language of the
statute.
201. A conclusion that the tax should be measured by apportioned gross re-
ceipts would sustain any challenge to the feasibility of apportionment. An apportion-
ment of the taxable gross receipts has been required based upon the ratio of mileage
traveled within the taxing state compared to the total mileage of the route. Central
Greyhound, 334 U.S. at 663. See also Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 264 (citing Central Grey-
hound for a possible apportionment formula based upon mileage traveled within the
taxing power state where the business activities of the taxpayer consisted of large
physical objects traveling over an identifiable route).
1995
Duquesne Law Review
Furthermore, the rule of law emerging from Jefferson Lines
creates uncertainty as to which state may impose a sales tax on
a subject transaction in interstate commerce where the
agreement, payment and partial delivery of the services does not
coincide in one state.2
The Court's holding may appeal to both taxpayers and
revenue authorities because it effectively results in an
administrative convenience that arises from an unapportioned
measure of tax. The decision results in a uniformity of an
unapportioned sales tax on both the sale of tangible goods and
certain services. There is perhaps a sense of practicality because
states of subsequent passage have limited resources to enforce
taxes against passengers that relate to the portion of services
provided within their state.
The Supreme Court will have numerous opportunities to forge
its jurisprudence concerning state taxes imposed upon services
in interstate commerce. The reasons for this are twofold: (1)
states are desperate to identify additional opportunities to
expand their revenue base without raising tax rates; and (2) the
continued emergence of a service-oriented U.S. economy. These
factors may encourage the formation of a multistate compact
that provides uniformity in sales and use taxation of interstate
services.
David J. Grecco
202. The Court reasoned that the passengers in Jefferson Lines could not be
subject to multiple taxation because the taxable event consisting of the agreement,
payment and partial delivery of the services could only occur in Oklahoma. Jefferson
Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1341.
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